Africa

Nigeria and Cameroon have come to an agreement in which Nigeria will cede to the former the possibly oil-rich (and long disputed) Bakassi peninsula. Nigeria is not exactly acting merely out of largesse. The international community has engaged in more than its share or arm twisting over the Bakassi dispute, and Nigeria appears to be making a virtue out of necessity, but that in and of itself is perhaps telling.

No country embodies the dual-edged sword that is the so-called “oil curse” more than Nigeria. And arguably no country’s oil industry is linked in the mind with violence more than Nigeria’s. Furthermore, countries have waged war over less than a potentially oil-abundant swath of land. If the agreement holds, this will qualify as a significant development.

Nigeria’s Niger Delta is an inflamed troublespot that does not look to have any easy solutions. Rebel groups continually sabotage the oil industry there, sometimes attacking, kidnapping, and even killing people associated with the oil industry, locals and foreigners alike. Whatever their methods, the rebels’ grievances are real. Between corruption, inefficiency, misallocation of resources, and simple differences in priorities, the oil curse is alive and well in Nigeria where very little benefit has trickled down to the country’s masses.

Nigerian President Yar-Adua has categorically rejected rumors that his government is going to look to the British military to intervene and crush rebellion in the Delta. Even granted that the West has always been a lot more willing to act to protect access to African resources than to protect African lives, the speculation about British intervention does not make a lot of sense logistically or politically. Nonetheless, the very existence of the rumors tells a great deal about the chaos that has enveloped the oil-rich yet otherwise impoverished Delta and the lengths to which some think the government will need to go to regain control.

Royal Dutch Shell has temporarily halted production at its biggest offshore oilfield, the Bonga installation, in Nigeria. The stoppage comes in response to an attack from the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND).

Nigeria might represent the quintessential example of the so-called oil or resource curse. By all rights Nigeria ought to be prospering as a result of the global market for oil. Instead Nigeria embodies the blend of neocolonialism, misguided Big Man politics, and generally incoherent policies that seems to befall so many African countries that discover the wealth brought by their black gold.

Combine Nigeria’s vast oil reserves and the instability those riches have brought with China’s avarice and rapaciousness when it comes to its thirst for oil and it seems to me that a recipe for disaster is simmering. China is prepared to loan Nigeria billions that in turn will grant the Chinese access to Nigeria’s reserves and markets. The problem with this arrangement is that Nigeria’s oil, which in theory should have enriched the country and helped its economy to prosper has proven to be a resource that has enriched a few at the expense of the many. China’s obstinate insistence on national sovereignty (well, for others anyway) means that Nigeria will have even less motivation to reform to ensure that oil is not a curse on the country. A partnership between China and Nigeria has disaster scrawled all over it.

There is an argument, and it is a plausible one, at least, that oil and other resources can represent a curse for African nations and other countries in the developing world. But certainly having resources is preferable to having none — if oil is a curse, that curse has dual edges, cutting good and cutting bad. Thus the news that Nigeria’s oil production could drop by a third if the country doesn’t find a way to work more efficiently rates as bad news, no matter how oil has in so many ways warped the vast country’s economy and created serious fissures in Nigerian society.

Kenya (more famously) and Nigeria have both been dealing with fraught internal negotiations regarding the inner workings of government. The stalemate over the composition of the cabinet (and thus the dynamics of power) continues in Kenya. Outside observers, including the British, have advised that Mwai Kibaki’s side be willing to give up some seats in order to bring about peace. Not surprisingly, Kibaki’s people don’t seem enamored of the idea. For peace to prevail, someone is going to have to yield. Kibaki feels he ought not to be the one because he is the President. Odinga’s side argues, not without merit, that Kibaki’s victory was illegitimate and that Kibaki ought to relent. Whether and how this stalemate is resolved will go a long way in determining Kenya’s future.

Meanwhile in Nigeria a similiarly contentious divide seems to have been closed. President Umaru Musa Yar-Adua and his opponents have come to an agreement over the budget crisis that has been hovering over the country. Nigeria’s status as a stable state continues to be tenuous. Suffice it to say that if that situation goes awry it has the potential to make the troubles in Kenya and Zimbabwe pale by comparison.

I do not always agree with J. Peter Pham, but there is little doubting his intelligence, knowledge, ability, and devotion to Africa-related issues. He is also one of the most significant voices among those who look at Africa from the vantage point of American policies and interests. He has a roundup of Africa-related issues at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies (full disclosure: I have been a fellow with FDD and still have a relationship with the organzation) via Family Security Matters. Included is news and commentary on Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, the Sahel, and Nigeria.

Nigeria is no stranger to Big Men. In that country they usually come from the military, are fond of coups, and do not relinquish power easily. So while it might be disquieting to hear that former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo tried to manipulate his country’s power structure in last week’s People’s Democratic Party convention, held in Abuja, it is surely reassuring to find out that the current President, Umaru Yar’Adua, would have none of it. Given that many feared that Yar’Adua was too closely tied to Obasanjo   when he came to office, the President’s willingness to deny his predecessor to impose his will (and foist his chosen chosen candidate for party chairmanship) should dispel concerns that his independence is compromised.