Africa

It is probably the first question most people ask when given a thumbnail sketch of the nightmare in Zimbabwe (and, to be honest, in many other places not only in Africa but around the globe): How do people survive? In the case of Zimbabwe, with its inflation in the hundreds of millions (231 million or so, though any assertion of the actual right imposes precision without providing accuracy), its scarcity of food and other commodities, its nonexistent jobs, its health crisis, they scavenge. They make do. They hustle. They stretch the little they have, and then they stretch further. They show their fundamental resourcefulness. They wake up in the moring wondering how they will make do, then they get by for the day, and go to bed wondering how they’ll make do the next day.

[Zimbabwean children picked up corn that had spilled from a truck on a recent Sunday along a road south of the capital, Harare. Tsvangirayi Mukwazhi for the Associated Press via The New York Times.]

Zimbabwe denied entry into the country this weekend to a group of respected international figures, including former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, former United States President Jimmy Carter, and human rights advocate (and wife of Nelson Mandela) Graca Machel. Called “The Elders,” the group did meet with Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) leader Morgan Tsvangirai in Johannesburg, but the fact that Tsvangirai had to travel to meet the three prominent figures shows just how little power he has as the negotiations for power-sharing agreements have sputtered to a standstill. Annan, Carter, and Machel plan to continue to try to help Zimbabweans as much as is possible from outside of the country’s borders.

From South Africa Jacob Zuma fears that Zimbabwe may collapse, though at this point one might need to know what definition of “collapse” we are using and whether Zimbabwe did not collapse long ago under the crushing weight of Robert Mugabe’s control. Meanwhile The New York Times points an accusing finger at South Africa in a frankly anachronistic editorial. I have long argued that for all of the criticism aimed at South Africa with regard to Zimbabwe, some of it justified, it is unclear exactly what power South Africa has over Zimbabwe that could actually bring about change short of raising arms. The Times seems especially exercised over South African aid to Zimbabwe even as it rightly acknowledges Morgan Tsvangirai’s rightful claims to the country’s leadership and his right not to acquiesce to Mugabe’s coercive negotiations. And yet Tsvangirai has been quite clear about his wariness of more sanctions against Zimbabwe even as he long ago anticipated The Times’ call for greater food and humanitarian aid.

Now probably is not the time for western sanctimony aimed somewhat blindly at South Africa about the crisis in Zimbabwe. Not when there is plenty of blame to go around not only in the west, but also where it really belongs, which is squarely on Robert Mugabe’s shoulders.

Despite the fact that South African farmers produced high yielding maize crops this year, a confluence of global factors means that this staple food for millions of South Africans may be unavailable or prohibitively expensive for the foreseeable future.  The poor, of course, will be the hardest hit: They rely the most on the crop and are the most vulnerable to scarcities and rising prices.  

Some states confront economic calamities. Some confront political tyranny. And in some cases the latter fuels the former. Such is the case in Zimbabwe where Robert Mugabe’s dictatorship quite clearly has exacerbated the country’s dire economic straits. The country’s citizens are facing acute hunger that stems from the country virtually running out of bread because grain shortages have led to the closing of bakeries. Indicative of the precarious state of public health, Bulawayo has only two dialysis machines, and those have broken down. Zimbabwe’s parliament has panicked (and possibly allowed Mugabe’s anti-foreign rhetoric to fuel its policies) by enacting the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Bill, which mandates that Zimbabweans must own a majority of foreign-run firms. This is likely only to fuel further withdrawals from capital on the part of companies and countries whose status in Zim was precarious to begin with. And, naturally, Mugabe continues to threaten further nationalization of the economy. In spite of all of these awful tidings, it is remarkable that some Zimbabweans still hold out hope, possibly because hope is all that remains.

Whatever progress Thabo Mbeki’s moderation might have made, it clearly is not enough and is likely to have little practical effect. Perhaps this is why Senegal’s President Abdoulaye Wade on Monday announced that he plans to travel to Zimbabwe this month to meet with Mugabe to recommend multilateral mediation by African heads of state. Does Wade’s plan represent more window dressing? The creation of a new echo chamber? An empty and ultimately futile gesture? Possibly. But at this point gestures are better than silence and acquiescence. Wade’s actions may represent an attempt to tweak his occasional rival Mbeki, but if it takes a clash of egos to push action on behalf of Zimbabwe’s people, so be it.

Economic development in Africa can be a daunting concept. Countries with little infrastructural foundation are difficult to penetrate, and one of the key dilemmas comes with where to start. Food security, political instability, military conflict and crime, economic chaos — these problems can make building roads and bridges and phone networks nearly impossible to conceive, never mind to execute.

Perhaps the best way to develop larger infrastucture is to start small. At least this is the argument of Ethan Zuckerman, a research fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School (and a former college classmate of your faithful scribe), in The Boston Globe. He discusses the case of Democratic Republic of the Congo entrepreneur Alieu Conteh, who founded the cellular telephone company that became Vodacom Congo:

His success is an example of a new strategy for building infrastructure in Africa that might revolutionize the continent. Called “incremental infrastructure,” the idea is to build essential facilities — telephone networks, power grids, roads — in small pieces using private investment, instead of relying on large, centrally planned, government-run projects. . . .

The infrastructure challenges most African nations face are enormous. Just to meet sub-Saharan Africa’s current power demands, for example, could cost $70 billion in new power plants — even more if African nations begin using power to process minerals locally instead of exporting them to China, North America, and Europe. But the success of entrepreneurs like Alieu Conteh suggests that African infrastructure is a big problem that demands a small solution.

We need to be wary of panaceas, of course. Big solutions and small solutions are necessary throughout Africa, but Zuckerman makes an important case inasmuch as executed properly, small solutions can become big ones, and by growing organically can help provide the development Africa most needs.

Privation connected to poverty and vulnerability to climate change is wreaking havoc throughout the continent. Lesotho continues to suffer from drought-fueled food shortages. The droughts have also affected Swaziland and South Africa. The economic crisis in Swaziland has led to increased sex trafficking among children as well as women. Informal settlements in Namibia are embody hell on earth. Climate change is leading to an increase in malaria cases in Kenya.

 The news of the increased UN-African Union peacekeeping presence has raised hopes of humanitarian relief for the people of Darfur. Sudan claims that it will support the troop presence. We;ll see how long Khartoum’s conciliatory attitude lasts. Some Sudanese, meanwhile, are looking to South Africa for a blueprint for peace.

At Foreign Policy Stephan Faris worries that the boomlet that parts of Africa appear to be enjoying might be chimerical, with oil fueling another manifestation of the resource curse. The Council for Foreign Relations explores the process of ”hunting for elusive peace.” Despite these real concerns, there also is real progress on parts of the continent, as Kofi Annan argues in the Mail & Guardian.

At The New Republic Eliza Griswold analyzes the Somalia crisis as “the other failed invasion,” which is problematic inasmuch as viewing Africa through the prism of Iraq manages to be both too Western-centric while at the same time allowing Iraq to disproportionately warp our views of other issues.

In order to address the mindboggling inflation rate in Zimbabwe (is it really possible that it could reach 100,000% by the end of the year?) the government has issued  a Z$200,000 note worth $1 US. Meanwhile, add water shortages to the daily sufferings of the people of Zim.  

Drought has exacerbated a food shortage which in turn has been exacerbating an HIV/AIDS-fueled health crisis in the tiny Mountain Kingdom of Lesotho. Maseru has declared a state of emergency. And things are probably going to get worse before they get better.

The United Nations Population Fund speculates that the urban population of Africa will more than double in the next quarter century. Obviously the ripple effects of this would be serious. It’s probably worth pointing out that dire population predictions have something of a mixed history, but the UNPF report indicates that 80% of the world’s population will live in the developing world by 2030 with huge ramificatioins for poerty, development, health, food supplies, and just about every other aspect of daily life.

A while back the Sunday New York Times had a front-page article (now archived, so you may need to pay to read it) on some remarkable successes that farmers in the Niger Delta have enjoyed. Chido Makunine of the African News Network provided a perceptive summary and assessment of the piece soon after it appeared. I particularly agree with Makunine’s emphasis on positive news coming from Africa. The Niger case provides a nice counter to the stream of bad news from the region that usually garners front-page treatment.

In our zeal to embrace alternative sources of energy, including biofuels, let’s keep in mind that there may be very real human costs. And not surprisingly those human costs will be felt by the most vulnerable. The most vulnerable often live in Africa. IRIN points out a recent report arguing:

The rush to produce biofuels, driven by the threat of global warming and higher oil prices, is exerting price pressure on staple foods in South Africa, according to a report by the Regional Hunger and Vulnerability Programme (RHVP), a nongovernmental organisation that highlights food security concerns. 

My colleague Bill Hewitt at the FPA Climate Change Blog has a post with lots of great links in which he explores these same complexities. None of this is intended to disavow the importance of alternative fuel sources, but rather simply to explicate the realities that environmental change will not be easy and that the trickle down effect will deleteriously effect the most vulnerable in Africa and elsewhere.