Africa

Few things in life are certain. The sun will rise, the sun will set, and journalists will look at an African crisis and almost inevitably chalk it up primarily to tribal rivalries — and usually they depict those rivalries as “ancient” (and thus somehow immutable). This lazy shorthand almost always obscures more than it elucidates and helps to keep Africa shrouded in myths and cliches.

Tim Butcher’s article on the Democratic Republic of the Congo in Prospect Magazine is thus especially welcome. Butcher argues that the problems in the Congo are attributable far more to historical circumstances surrounding the exploitation of mineral resources than to largely incidental ethnic conflicts.  While this argument may carry with it its own reductionist dangers, it far surpasses the hoary tribal explanation in sophistication and nuance.

There was an apparent coup attempt in Guinea-Bissau over the weekend.  This IRIN report shows how the coup attempt “has underscored the country’s chronic political volatility.”

Amidst the constant thrum of tumult in Zimbabwe — the criticism from foreign dignitaries locked out of the country, the outbreak of cholera throughout much of the country, a surge in anthrax that has killed both people and livestock, and the general humanitarian crisis caused by mismanagement, malfeasance, and avarice on the party of the country’s leaders — there is a glimmer of hope that serious talks will resume between the main antagonists in the country’s political stalemate.

With all of the verbiage flowing and the spin doctors in full effect in South African politics today, it is hard to separate what is true from what is self serving, what is accurate from what is accusation. To wit, consider the following questions (with answers that I humbly submit for your consideration):
Is South Africa facing a potential civil war? (This seems more like hyperbolic fear-mongering than it does a legitimate assessment of the facts on the gorund.)

Is it possible that for all of the division in South African politics the ANC is poised to garner more than 70% of the vote in next year’s elections? (With all due respect to the pollsters, this seems like an impossibility. If the ANC has actually consolidated its strength in recent years, and especially in recent months, it would be the missed South African story of the decade.)

Is the Congress of the People (COPE) likely to emerge as a savior in South African politics? (No. And to burden any party with such expectations would be silly. For COPE to burden itself with such pronouncements seems suicidal.)

Is the ANC actually “doing COPE’s publicity work” for them? (Sometimes it seems as much.)

Zimbabwe denied entry into the country this weekend to a group of respected international figures, including former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, former United States President Jimmy Carter, and human rights advocate (and wife of Nelson Mandela) Graca Machel. Called “The Elders,” the group did meet with Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) leader Morgan Tsvangirai in Johannesburg, but the fact that Tsvangirai had to travel to meet the three prominent figures shows just how little power he has as the negotiations for power-sharing agreements have sputtered to a standstill. Annan, Carter, and Machel plan to continue to try to help Zimbabweans as much as is possible from outside of the country’s borders.

From South Africa Jacob Zuma fears that Zimbabwe may collapse, though at this point one might need to know what definition of “collapse” we are using and whether Zimbabwe did not collapse long ago under the crushing weight of Robert Mugabe’s control. Meanwhile The New York Times points an accusing finger at South Africa in a frankly anachronistic editorial. I have long argued that for all of the criticism aimed at South Africa with regard to Zimbabwe, some of it justified, it is unclear exactly what power South Africa has over Zimbabwe that could actually bring about change short of raising arms. The Times seems especially exercised over South African aid to Zimbabwe even as it rightly acknowledges Morgan Tsvangirai’s rightful claims to the country’s leadership and his right not to acquiesce to Mugabe’s coercive negotiations. And yet Tsvangirai has been quite clear about his wariness of more sanctions against Zimbabwe even as he long ago anticipated The Times’ call for greater food and humanitarian aid.

Now probably is not the time for western sanctimony aimed somewhat blindly at South Africa about the crisis in Zimbabwe. Not when there is plenty of blame to go around not only in the west, but also where it really belongs, which is squarely on Robert Mugabe’s shoulders.

Is piracy in the Gulf of Aden helping to create the (im?)perfect storm leading to one of Barack Obama’s first serious crises upon taking office? It sure seems that way. Shipping firms, which are suffering some of the worst losses at the hands of the Somali brigands, are demanding action. India’s navy is stepping up its presence in the gulf. And the economic and political instability that created and enabled piracy in the first place shows no sign of improving. In short, this is not a story that seems likely to fade any time soon and it will almost certainly draw the attention of an Obama administration fairly early.

How many international sporting programs would look at a season of nine wins and four losses as a disaster? One such situation is playing out in South Africa, where the Springboks are in England to play the hosts at Twickenham this weekend. From The Mail & Guardian, “The End of a Dismal Year“:

A disappointing Springbok season ends at Twickenham on Saturday. The world champions play their 13th Test of 2008 with a record that reads: won eight, lost four.

The addition of a fifth loss would make it into a fairly dismal year, while a ninth win would not necessarily change that perception, which is pretty much the definition of a no-win situation.

South Africans have high expectations of their big three international teams, rugby, soccer, and cricket.  But sometimes the burden of the expectations surrounding those teams is unreasonable, and even counterproductive. The folderol surrounding the Springboks might be just such a case.

With the announcement that it plans to lay 2,300 kilometers of fiber-optic cable in the next year, Rwanda has taken the lead in communications technology in Central Africa. Nearly any discussion about Rwanda, whether positive or critical, takes place against the backdrop of the 1994 genocide and the context that created it. This decision marks a huge step forward for that country and will help transform the country’s economy while allowing it to become a regional telecommunications hub.

This news takes place against the backdrop of the seemingly perpetual chaos just across Rwanda’s border in eastern Congo.  Any positive developments in Rwanda occur against the backdrop of that vortex, into which Rwanda could be (and has been in past conflicts) easily subsumed. Thus Rwandans, though not Rwandans alone or even primarily, have to hope that a possible commitment of 3,000 more UN troops will stabilize the region long enough for negotiations and a political solution to emerge. Rwandans, Congolese, Ugandans, Burundians and others simply cannot afford a perpetual cycle of one-step-forward, two-steps-back. People with the least ground to lose cannot afford to lose more.

Time magazine argues in a recent piece on Mugabe that the intransigent president  “clings on, but his power is waning.” I have no quarrels with the article, which hits all of the necessary marks in a piece written for a genralist audience that has little background on Zimbabwe (or most any other particular African issue).  Megan Lindow, the author (with help from Simba Rushwaya in Harare), even acknowledges how easy it is for Zimbabwe to recede and get buried amidst not only the global economic crisis but the stories du jour from Africa (piracy in Somalia, chaos in the Congo).

But one point that the article misses is that in Zimbabwe (indeed much of the rest of Africa, or even the world) a despot like Mugabe is at his most dangerous when he is most vulnerable. Now is when Zimbabweans should fear the heavy footsteps of the security forces and the menacing approach of the so-called war veterans. Now is when they should expect pronouncements that barely cover in shadow implicit threats of violence and other retribution. In many ways, Mugabe barely clinging on to power is perhaps the most ominous state of all, at least in the short term.

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